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A PERFECT COPY: 
INDIAN CULTURE AND TRIBAL LAW 
Matthew L. M. Fletcher 
Introduction 
Leech Lake Ojibwe novelist and University of Minnesota 
literature professor David Treuer declared in his new hook of 
literary criticism that "Native American fiction does not 
CXiSt."l The New York Times described the book as "a kind of 
manifesto, which argues that Native American writing should 
be judged as literature, not as a cultural artifact, or as a means 
of revealing the mystical or sociological core of Indian life to 
. non-Natives.,,2 Treuer uses the trickster story "Wenebozho 
and the Smartberries"~in which the Anishinaahe trickster 
Wenehozho3 tricks a not-so-smart Indian guy into eating 
small, dried turds by calling them "smartherries,,4-as the 
punch line to his argument focusing on Turtle Mountain Band 
Chippewa writer Louise Erdrich.5 In short, Treucr alleges that 
American Indian novelists claiming to represent American 
Indian culture are frauds. 
1 DAVID TREUER, NATIVE AMERICAN FICTION: A USER'S MANUAL 191 
(2006). 
2 Dinitia Smith, American Indian Writing, Seen Through a New Lens, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 19,2006, at B9. 
3 Alternate spellings ba.<;cd on regional dialects include "Waynaboozhoo," 
EDWARD BENTON-BENAI, THE MrSHOMIS BOOK: TIm VOICE OF THE 
OJIBWE 29 (1979) (Indian Country Press, Inc, 1981); "Nanabush," JOHN 
BORROWS, .RncoVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDlGENOUS LAW 
17 (2002); and "Nanabozho," Nanabozho, in OJlBW A NARRATIVES OF 
CHARLES AND CHARLOTTEKAWBAWGUM AND JACQUES LEPIQUE, 1893-
1895, at 25 (Arthur P. Bourgeois ed, 1994). 
4 TREUER, supra note I, at 50-52 (quoting Rose Foss, l1'hy Wenaboozhoo 
L~ So Smart, 4 OSHKAABEWIS NATIVE]. 33-34 (1997». 
5 See id. at 29-68 (criticizing LoUISE ERDRlCH, LOVE MEDICINE (1993)), 
This paper reviews David Treuer's cntIque of Indian 
novelists in the context of Indian culture and tribal law. The 
basis for Treuer's argument that "Native American fiction" 
does not exist6 -that good writing by American Indian authors 
that appears to bring to life the culture of American Indian 
people is not like that at all, but instead is just a very good 
copy of Indian culture--has a great deal of application to the 
debatcs over the use of tribal customary law in tribal courts. 
One goal of modem Indian tribal governments is to restore 
tribal customary law as an important piece of the legal 
infrastmcture of Indian tribes in order to preserve the lifeways 
and law ways of Indian people, a critical part ~f preserving 
and advancing Indian cultures. Tribes and their judges 
recognize that the customary law of their ancestors is difficult 
to discover and apply tribal customary law, for many tribal 
communities, exists only as a memory. Treuer's argument is 
that Indian writers invoke Indian culturc as a "memory," not 
"reality," or "the longing for culture, not its presence,,7 -and 
all of this is not authentic culture. Treuer's views on Indian 
literature have a great deal to say about the discovery and 
application of tribal law. Likewise, theorizing about tribal 
customary law provides an important counterweight to 
Treuer's thesis. This paper attempts to discuss and reconcile 
these competing views. 
I. Culture and the Law 
Law and culture arc inextricably intertwincd. As 
Lawrence Rosen wrote, "[L Jaw docs not exist in isolation. To 
understand how a eulturc is put together and operates, 
therefore, one cannot fail to consider law; to consider law, one 
. cannot fail to see it as part of culture."s II.L.A. Hart's theory 
of primary and secondary mles9 has special import in any 
discussion of the relation between culture, literature, and the 
(; TREUER, supra notc 1, at 191. 
7 David Treuer, Smartberries: Interpreting Erdrich's Love Medicine, 29 
AM. INDiAN CULTURE & REs. 1. 21, 35 (2005) (emphasis added). 
8 LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION 5 (2006). 
9 See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-96 (1961). 
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law. The "primary rules" component of Professor Hart's work 
derives from a cultural framework--or as he termed it, "the 
idea of obligation."lo "[P]rimitive communities," Professor 
Hart theorized, were examples of societies that lived under 
primary rules of obligation, "where, though there are 
dissidents and malefactors, the majority live by the rules seen 
from the internal point of view."jl These primary rules stem· 
from the culture itself, or from the past. 12 The primary mles 
settle into what Professor Hart referred to as "secondary 
rules," those legal rules that operate as "remedies"· to the 
defects in primary ndes that tend to make primary mles 
unenforceable and unworkable in the complexity of modem 
society.13 These secondary rules offer certainty, flexibility, 
and efficiency to the primary rules. 14 In Ronald Dworkin's 
paraphrasing of Hart's model, "[T]he combination of first-
order standards imposing duties and second-order standards 
regulating the creation and identification of those first-order 
rules is a central feature of paradigmatic legal systems.,,15 Or, . 
put another way by legal anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel, 
"[A]ll systems of law, whatever their content and unique 
dynamics, must have some essential elements in common .... 
We must have some idea of how a society works before we 
can have a full conception of what law is and how it works."j6 
10 HART, supra note 9, at 79; see also id. at 85 ("Rules are conceived and 
spoken of as imposing obligations when the general demand for 
conforming is insistent and the social pressure brought to bcar upon those 
who deviate or threaten to deviate is great. "). 
1 t HART, supra note 9, at 89. 
12 See Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHIL. 237, 240 (1986) 
("Every tradition is composed of elements drawn from the real or an 
imagined past."); id. at 241 ("In every established legal system, the legal 
pa~t is central to the legal present. Like all complex traditions, law records 
and preserves a composite of (frequently inconsistent) beliefs, opinions, 
values, decisions, myths, rituals, deposited over generations."). 
13 . . 
- See HART, supra note 9, at 89-95. 
14 c> 
vee HART, supra note 9, at 91-93. 
15 Ronald Dworkin, Hart and the Concepts of Law, 119 HARV: L. REV. F. 
95, 100 (2006). . 
16 E. ADAMSON BOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN: A STUDY TN 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL DYNAMICS 5 (1961). 
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Justice Holmes' lectures "demonstrate[d] that the conccpt of 
liability [for example] as it occurs in both criminal law and the 
law of torts originates in a moral impulse and invokes a moral 
standard ... ,,17 -that is, culture. 
Like culture, law must be flexible. One of the "defects" 
Professor Hart identified in a society governed by primary 
rules is the "static" character of first-order rules. 18 Primary 
rules take.a slow route to change--~their "growth" from custom 
to rule and their eventual "decay" to allachronism. 19 Professor 
Hart's remedy for the static character of primary rules wa..o;; for 
societies to adopt rules of change.2o The unconscionability 
defense (allegedly borrowed by Karl Llewellyn's- study of the 
Cheyenne Indians21) arose as a means to combat the 
formulism and harshness of common law contract doctrine.22 
Law's flexibility helps to ensure that law and culture remain 
consistent to the extent that law remains legitimate to the 
members of the community. To the extent that law and culture 
are not four square with each other (broadly speaking, of 
course), law is illegitimate.23 
Consider a foreign visitor or an Indigenous community 
member living under the American legal regime, a problem in 
a legal system that does not take into consideration the values 
of the outsider. Ginnah Muhammad, a devout Muslim, wore a 
veil to court. in a small claims case in Hamtramck, Michigan, 
17 ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PArN: TIlE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF 
THE WORLO 295 (l985) (citing OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW 33 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963 (1881)). 
18 HART, supra note 9, at 90. 
[9 HART, supra note 9, at 90. 
20 See HART, supra note 9, at 93. 
21 See ROSEN, supra note 8, at 30. 
22 See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 298 (4th 
cd. 2004). Cj ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES MOVEMENT 60-62 (1983). 
23 See Jerome E. Bickenbach, Law and Morality, 8 LAW & PHIL. 291, 292 
(1989). Cj RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? 
PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW DEMOCRATIC DEBATE 94~98 (2006) (moral 
legitimacy of governments); DUNCAN A CRlTlQUE OF 
ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE 202-03 (1997) (legitimacy of decisions 
rendered in accordance with judicial ideologies). 
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where the judge threw out her case because she refused to 
removc the veil and he would not be ablc to see her facc.24 A 
federal district court took jurisdiction over a claim bought 
against a tribal community attempting to resolve internal 
disputes through traditional measures of tcmporary 
banislunent or exclusion.25 American laws derive fTom Anglo-
American values as expressed in the original understanding of 
the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, or in the common law or 
torts or contracts or criminal laws. 
Ultimately, that systems of law codes enacted by 
legislatures and common law doctrines applied by judiciaries 
ongmate with a community's culture should be 
noncontroversiaL Even the so-called "primitive" societies, 
Levi-Strauss proved,had law: 
Given the cmcial role that marriage mles play 
in the organization of human affairs, it follows 
that no society, including those of indigenous 
peoples and settles, can be fairly characterized 
as being less rule-governed than any other. 
Thus, humans could never have lived in a state 
of nature as posited by Social Contract 
theorists, nor could any society exist that was 
"so low on the scale of social organization" as 
to be "incommensurate" with any other as 
supposed by In re: Southern Rhodesia.26 
According to Professor Rosen, widely varying kinds of 
cultures have adopted doctrines of law that look suspiciously 
24 See Steven Lubet, Veiled Truth, TIlE AMERICAN LAWYER, March I, 
2007, available a: http://www.law.eomijsp/tal/PubArtielcTALjsp?hubtype 
=Inside&id= 1172570587864. 
25 See Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.n. CaL 2004); see also 
Poodry v. Tonanwanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85F.3d 874, 889 (2d Cir.) 
("The respondents urged at oral argument that '(reason,' though a criminal 
act in our judicial system, is not necessarily 'criminal' in a traditional 
nation such as the Tonawanda Band. We doubt that this appeal to cultural 
relativism is relevant to our inquiry. "), cer!. denied, 519 U.S. 1041 (1996). 
26 Michael Asch, Levi-Strauss and the Political: The Elementary Structures 
of Kinship and the Resolution of Relations between Indigenous People and 
Settler States, 11 1. ROYAL. ANTHROP. INST. 425,434 (2005) (quoting In 
re: Southern Rhodesia [1919] A.C. 211 (Eng. P.C.)). 
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like unconscionability, for example,27 showing that even what 
anthropologists would have called "primitive" societies could 
generate rules that "civilized" could borrow. The 
next section will demonstrate the history of American 
Indian tribal law in the context of the history of federal-tribal 
relations. Under this relationship, the United States 
transformed law-borrowing and sharing into a one-way street 
of imposition and dominance over Indian tribes. 
H. The Emergence of Tribal Courts and Tribal Law 
A. Tribal Law 
Indian nations have always lived in accordance with their 
own laws and norms, but the intervention of Euro-American 
nations in the western hemisphere has aU but destroyed the 
understanding of these rules. Many indigenous laws and 
norms were incorporated into the languages and stories of 
Indian communities.2R Stories and rules had meaning and 
relevance to Indian people so long as they were tied to a 
particular territory?9 Colonization wiped much of that 
understanding away. The classic example is the so-called 
Crow Dog case, involving a political murder in Indian 
Country.30· When the tribal community refused to execute the 
murderer and instead adopted a traditional punishment 
consistent with the community's needs, American Indian 
27 See ROSEN, supra note 8, at 30-34 (noting the Cheyenne Indians and the 
nation of fndia as not to mention the United States). 
28 See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HODEL, THE 
CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASRLA W IN PRIMITIVE JURlSPRUDENCE 
(1941); BRUCE G. THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE; TRADITION AND 
LAW IN THE COAST SALISH WORLD (2000); WATSON SMITH & JOHN M. 
ROBERTS, ZUNI LAW: A FlELD OF VALUES (1954); Richard Posner, A 
Theory oj Primitive with Special ReJerence to /,aw, 23 J. L. & 
ECON. 1 (1980). 
29 E.g., K..Enlf H. WISDOM SITS IN PLACES: LANDSCAPE AND 
LANGUAGE AMONG THE WESTERN APACHE 37-70 (1996); Melissa L. 
Meyer, "We Can Not Get a as We Used To ": Dispossession and the 
White Earth Anishinaabeg, 1889-1920,96 AM. HIST. REv. 368 (l99t). 
30 Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
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agents demanded a federal prosecution.31 And when the 
Supreme Court held that federal COUlis had no jurisdiction in 
Indian Country (because it would be unfair to apply American 
"civilized" laws to "savage" Indians who would have no hope 
of understanding or complying with them32), the federal 
govemment enacted the Major Crimes Act,3.> extending 
federal criminal jurisdiction and American criminal law values 
into Indian Country.34 Federal criminal justice values began to 
1 'b I . . 35 rep ace tn a Justlce systems: . 
The United States further brought "justice" to Indian 
Country by enforcing law and order codes against Indian 
people.36 The codes, enforced by "courts of Indian offenses," 
were intended to guarantee federal control over Indian people 
and eliminate tribal religious and cultural practices?7 
3l See Secretary ofInterior, Annual Report at 9 (1884), reprinted in DAVID 
H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKlNSON, & ROBERT A. WILLTAMS, JR., CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 157 (5th ed. 2005); Sidney L. 
Harring, Crow Dog's Case: .4 Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal 
Sovereignty, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 191,223 (1989). 
32 Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. at 405-06; cl ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE 
A LOADED WEAPON: TIlE RRHNQUTST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERlCA J 09 (2005) (showing how the 
Kan-gi-shun-ca Court reasoning was used later by then-Justice Rehnquist 
to divest lndian tribes of criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 2lO-11 (1978)). 
33 Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385, codified as amended at 18 
U.s.c. § 1153. . 
34 See Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, Tribal 
Courts, the Model Code, and the Police .Idea in American Indian Policy, 
40 LAW & CONTE~PORARY PROBLEMS 25, 26-49 (1976); Kevin K. 
Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. 
L REV. 779, 790-809 (2006). 
35 See VINE DELORIA .. JR. & CUl'FORJ) M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, 
AMERlCAN JUSTICE 110-16 (1984). 
36 See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 35, at J \3- Hi, e.g., United States 
v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888) (upholding the regulations promulgated 
by the Secretary oflnterior known as the "law and order codes"). 
37 See Clapox, 35 F. at 577 ("These 'courts of Indian offenses' are ... 
educational and disciplinalY instrumentalities, by which the government of 
the United States is endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition of 
these dependent tribes to whom it sustains the relation of guardian. In fact, 
the reservation itself is in the nature of a school, and the Indians are 
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American boarding schools and religious missionaries, all 
funded and controlled by the United States, contributed to the 
destruction of tribal languages and religions.38 The 
dispossession of Indian lands eradicated tribal learning as well 
by removing Indian people from their sacred places, away 
from where their cultural histories were tied.39 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act 
that authorized Indian tribes to "reorganize" under the model 
of local and municipal govcmmcnts.40 While most of the 
benefits of the theory of reorganizing Indian tribes did not 
inure to the tribes until at least the 1970s for a variety of 
reasons,41 after 1934, stated Congressional-policy tended to 
favor tribal government systems. The implementation of the 
Act suffers from continuing federal bureaucratic control and 
intervention even to the present day, but the Act serves as the 
critical goveming document oqhe relationship between Indian 
tribes and the federal govemment. While the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs once mandated boilerplate tribal constitutions that 
limited tribal government authority and structure,42 the Bureau 
gathered there, under the charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring 
the habits, ideas, and aspirations which distinguish the civilized from the 
uncivilized man."). 
3H See, e.g., I.D.C. Atkins, The English Language in Indian Schools, 
reprinted in AMERICANIZING TUE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE 
"FRIENDS OF TIlE INDIAN" 1800-1900, at 197-206 (Francis Paul Prucha cd. 
1973) (advocating for the replacement of Indian languages with English). 
39 For histories of the dispossession of Indian hmds, see STUART BANNER, 
How THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER 
(2005) and LiNDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: How THE 
DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR 
LANDS (2005). 
40 Wheeler-Howard Act (Indian Reorganization Act), 48 Stat. 984-988 
(l934), cod~fied as amended 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. 
41 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights: 1950-1953: A 
Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L. J. 348 (1953) (detailing the actions 
of the Bureau oflndian Affairs in stining tribal govemancedevelopment); 
Comment, Tribal SellGovernment and the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934,70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972). 
42 See Timothy W. Ioranko & Mark C. Van' Norman, Indian Selj~ 
Determination At Bay: Secretarial Authority to Disapprove TrilJai 
Con:~titutional Amendments, 29 GONZ. L. REv. 81 (1993-94), . 
102 YMR 
now grants broader leeway to tribes to determine their own 
constitutional foundation. While the Bureau once retained all 
but complete control over tribal affairs by retaining secretarial 
veto power over all tribal govemment actions,43 now tribal 
govemments are freer to make their own laws with less 
Bureau intervention. 
B. Tribal Courts 
Tribal courts and tribal common law have made an 
impressive comeback in the latter half of the 20th century and 
beyond. Well over 200 tribes now have a functioning tribal 
court system and most of the remaining tribes are in the 
process of developing a tribal court system. And these tribal 
courts are not necessarily copies of state and federal courts. 
They follow their own court rules and tribal constitutions, 
statutes, and regulations. Outside of the criminal law context,44 
none of these decisions are reviewable on the merits by state 
or federal courtS.45 The final decision of the highest tribal 
court is final and complete. 
Tribal court systems existed from the beginning of the 
Indian treaty period. The Cherokee Nation long has had a 
tribal court system from the Treaty of Hopewell period from 
the late 1700s to the Removal era, and then again from the 
early 1840s until the United States temlinated the Nation.46 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs created Courts of Indian 
OfIenses, later often referred to as CFR Courts, to dispense 
law and order ntlings.47 The courts were not indigenous in any 
way, as they were used by Indian· agents to enforce the 
43 See, e.g., Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating 
Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 
STAN. L. REv. 1061 (1974) (describing the Secretary ofInterior's control 
over the leasing of Indian lands). 
44 See 25 U.S.c. § 1303 (extending the Great Writ to tribal criminal cases). 
45 See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe ofIndians, 471 U.S. 
845 (1985). 
4<j See generally RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE 
LAWFRQMCLANTOCOURT 120-67 (1975). 
47 See Christine Zuni, Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN. J. L. & PUB. 
POL'y 17,20 (1997). 
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notorious law and order codes and stamp out Indian religious 
and culture.4& 
The emergence of tribal courts and tribal law in the latter 
half of the 20th century is a result of a series of political and 
legal factors. In 1959, during the Termination Era, the 
Supreme Court decided Williams v. 49 which held that 
tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising in 
Indian Country where the defendant is a reservation Indhm.50 
The Court explicitly recognized that tribes have the right to 
make their own laws and be governed by them. 5 I In 1968, 
Congress enacted the lndian Civil Rights Act.52 The Act 
operated as a severe restriction (from Congress's point of 
view) of tribal sovereignty by requiring tribal governments to 
follow a series of restrictions on their authority the so~called 
Indian Bill of Rights.53 In 1978, the Supreme Court in Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez held that tribal courts could interpret 
the Indian Bill of Rights in accordance with tribal customs and 
traditions. 54 As important, the Court held that the civil rights 
protected in the Indian Civil Rights Act could be enforced 
against the tribe only in a tribal forum, such as a tribal court.55 
By the 1990s, Congressional, policy favored the development 
and jurisdiction of tribal courts nationwide:S6 . 
48 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERlCAN INDIAN LAW 
AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 21 (1995) (describing how the federal 
government drove the "core of the culture ... into a shadow existence"). 
49 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
50 See id. at 223. 
51 See id. at 220 ("Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the 
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and beruled by them."). 
52 25 U .S.C. § 1301 et seq. 
53 25 US.c. § J 302. 
54 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978) (HCongress may also have considcred that 
resolution of statutory issues under § 1302, and particularly those issues 
likely to arise in a civil context, will frequently depend on questions of 
tribal tradition and custom which tribal fonlms may be in a better position 
to evaluate than federal courts."). 
55 See id. 
56 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian 
Policy, 85 NEB. L. REv. 121, 147-50 (2006). 
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C. The Problem of Tribal Customary Law 
In the present era, tribal governments and tribal courts 
face an interesting dilemma--tribal legislatures are freer now 
than ever before to enaet statutes, ordinances, and regulations 
that originate with Indian people and culture, or what I have 
referred to as "Indigenous legal constructs,,,S7 for lack of a 
better tenn. Tribal lawmakers can now reach back into tribal 
values, culture, customs, and traditions to make laws that are 
meaningful to the tribal community, that are local solutions to 
local problems. But these lawmakers often borrow large 
chunks of state, local, or federal law to fill up tribal code 
boo~.58 In many instances, a major tribal statute constitutes a 
few sentences indicating that the tribal government will follow 
state. law in a particular field, such as probate law or 
commercial law.59 The Anglo-American cultural and legal 
values that shaped and infonned the development of these 
statutes is brought unencumbered into tribal law without much 
consideration of the impacts. To be fair, in many of these 
instances, there are very good pragmatic reasons for importing 
state and federal law. Tribes under fInancial and time 
limitations might be required by a lender to adopt the Unifonn 
Commercial Code, for example.60 ln many other instances, 
however, tribal lawmakers carefully consider and construct 
tribal statutes to meet critical tribal community needs with 
culturally relevant legal and political solutions. The rise of 
57 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, To'ward a Theory of Intertribal and Intratrihal 
Common Law, 43 HOUSTON L. REv. 701, 720-2 J (2006). 
58 See W cnona T. Singel, Cultural Sovereignty and Transplanted Law: 
Tensions in Indigenous Se!f:Rule, 15 KAN. L L. & PUB. POL'y 357, 359-60 
(2006). 
59 E.g., 9 GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CODE § 201(a) ("The Grand Traverse 
Band adopts the laws, codes, ordinances, and other instnllnents of the law 
of the State of Michigan to the extent these instruments, laws, codes, and 
ordinances do not conflict with appropriate federal law or Tribal codes, 
ordinances, and laws in force now or enacted in the future."), 
60 See Singd, supra note 58, at 360. 
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tribal statutes intending to protect cultural property is a great 
example.61 
But all too often, tribal lawmakers take the easier route of 
borrowing Anglo-American legal constructs. Many of these 
statutes. languish on the books, with the tribal community 
underutilizing them because they have little or no meaning or 
relevance to the community. Tribal government is, like all 
government, reactionary, meaning that tribal lawmakers have 
time only for reacting to issues and problems that arise. It is 
rare when tribal governments havc the opportunity to act 
progressively, anticipating problems and enacting solutions to 
them. The wiggle room recognized under federal Indian law 
often goes unfilled. Perhaps part of the problem is that the 
very idea of lawmaking via legislation and rules promulgation 
is not Indigenous. 
Concurrently, tribal courts face similar circumstances. 
Tribal judges have enormous discretion and opportunity to 
find, announce, and apply tribal customary and traditional 
law.62 But only a few tribal courts take this opportunity on a 
consistent basis.63 There are many factors that play into this, 
including the fact that litigants before tribal courts rarely make 
their arguments in reliance on tribal customary law. Moreover, 
tribal customary law is notoriously difficult to discover and 
understand by judges trained in Anglo-American law, even for 
those who are tribal members. Finally, tribal customary law 
often appears to have little to say about disputes in modem 
tribal communities. 
In short, there is a dearth of customary and traditional law 
in modern tribal law. While traditional legal theory could offer 
61 See generally Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing": Toward an 
Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REv. 69 
(2005). 
62 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal COUlt 
JurL~prudence, 13 MICll. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2007), manuscript 
at 9-16, available at http://works.bepress.comlmatthew_.fletchcr/5. 
63 See Steve Aycock, Thoughts on Creating a Truly Tribal Jurisprudence, 
compiled in Indigenous Justice Systems of North America, 2nd Annual 
Indigenous Law Conference, Michigan State University College of Law 
(March 17-18, 2006) (on file with author). 
106 YMR 
numerous solutions to alleviating the crisis, American Indian 
literary criticism offers a different view. 
III. "A Perfect Copy" of Tribal Customs 
David Treuer's remarkable book of literary cntlclsm 
offers a powerful critique of Native American literature; 
namely, that there is no such thing. Professor Treuer rejects 
three tenets of Native American literature; first, that "Native 
American literature contains within it links to culturally 
generated forms of storytelling;,,64 second, that "Native 
American literature reflects the experience of Native 
Americans in the United and third, "Native 
American literature acts out, by virtue of its cultural material, 
a tribally inflected, ancient form of 'postmodern' discourse.,,66 
Emphasizing the third point, Treuer argues that the novels of 
Louise Erdrich, for example, "arc not made up of ... Indian 
life. Love Medicine is created through a stunning array of 
literary techniques, sourced mostly from Western fiction. The 
real miracle is that with these foreign tools Erdrich 
convincingly suggests Ojibwe life.,,67 Indian novelists like 
Erdrich, according to Treuer, are selling a "copy" of Native 
American life. And "[ w]e would never pay $43 mi11ion for a 
copy of Van Gogh, even if it were a perfect copy.,,68 
Professor Treuer's thesis has much to offer in the theory 
of the discovery and application of tribal customary law in 
tribal law and tribal jurisprudence. One could roughly apply 
Treuer's framework on literature to tribal law, almost with a 
find-and-replace method. While there are limitations to this 
exercise, it is worthwhile to try. Consider the three tenets that 
Treuer reje.cts. _ 
Begin by contemplating "Native American literature does 
not contain within. it links to culturally generated forms of 
storytelling," the first tenet reworded to conform to Treuer's 
64 TREUER, supra note I, at 191. 
65 TREUER, supra note 1, at 192 
66 TREUER, supra note 1, at 192. 
67 TREUER, supra note 1, at 67. 
68 TREUER, supra note 1, at 193. 
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point. Treuer's proof is Erdrich's Love Medicine, where all the 
Indian characters speak English (a "beautiful and telTible 
deficit") and "the very structure of the stories they tell, and 
their contents, are not only modern, they are 'Western. ",69 To 
put Treuer's critique another way, perhaps too glibly, is to say 
that there can be no "Native American novels" because Indian 
people living in the culture do not (did not) tell cultural stories 
in the fonn of a novel, let alone in English. 
Consider Treuer's second tenet, that "Native American 
literature docs not ret1ect the experience of Native Americans 
in the United States." Treuer argues that literary critics who 
treat Native American novels as "historical" documents have 
missed the point.70 As the critical example, Treuer's points to 
the assertion by one critic that James Welch's Fools Crow 71 is 
"the closest we will ever come in literature to an 
understandio.g of what life was like for a western Indian ... .',72 
Treuer goes to a great deal of trouble to prove that Fools Crow 
is not historically accurate, nor could it be under any 
• 73 CIrcumstances. 
Apply these tenets to tribal law and you have "Tribal law 
does not contain within it links to culturally generated fonns 
of adjudication" and "Tribal law does not ret1eet the 
experience of Native Americans in the United States." These 
are both valid statements, as shown in Part II. Tribal 
legislation and jurisprudence often deviates in significant and 
substantive ways from Indian lifeways and law ways that 
Indian pcople living in the culture would not understand. 
Indian people prior to contact (and even for long after) did not 
resort to tribal courts to resolve disputes, nor did they often 
rely upon written prohibitions or restrictions on personal 
conduct, as excmplified by modem tribal codes. Indian people, 
69 TREUER, supra note 1, at 66. 
70 See TREUEH, supra note 1, at 192 (quoting CLEANTH BROOKS & ROBERT 
PENN WARREN, UNDERSTANDING POETRY: AN ANTHOLOGY FOR COLLEGE 
STUDENTS iv (1938)). 
7! JAMES WELCH, FOOLS CROW (1986). 
72 TREUER, supra note 1, at 78 (quoting Dee Brown). This quotation 
appeared as a book jacket blurb. 
73 See generally TREUER, supra note l, at 77~107. 
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with the possible exception of certain insular tribal 
communities, have been forced to move on from the customs 
and traditions of their ancestors. Tribal law does not and 
cannot recreate tribal history or culture perfectly. So far, we 
are four square with Professor Treuer. 
Treuer's third tenet offers more difficulty: "Native 
American literature does not act out, by virtue of its cultural 
material, a tribally inflected, ancient form of 'postmodem' 
discourse." Treuer describes the meaning of this tenet, in part, 
as thus: The novels of American Indians are not American 
Indian culture; instead, they are very good copies of American 
Indian culture. And the better the writer, the better the copy 
will be. Writers like Louise Erdrich, Leslie SiIko, James 
Welch, and Shennan Alexie are very good at their craft (which 
involves using a westernized, Anglo-American set of literary 
tools), according to Treuer, and they use their skills to make 
the very best copies. But their work can never be part of 
Treuer's "cultural patrimony.,,74 Treuer concluded, "Our 
written literature in English is responsive to a sct of historical 
circumstances, inventive in its evasiveness, rich in its 
suggestive capabilities, but ultimately, it is not culture.,,75 
Seen in this light, Treuer's third tenet offers an analog to 
the status of modem tribal law, codes, and jurispmdence. 
Other than in limited enclaves such as the Navajo Nation, the 
Hopi Tribe, and other insular tribal communities where the 
first language spoken is tribal, the law of I ndian tribes is in 
English. Tribal customary law and traditions as understood 
and lived by ancestors has been eroded by centuries of 
invasion, ethnocide, arid grief The tribal statutes enacted by 
modem tribal legislatures can be inibnned by tribal customary 
law, perhaps, but they cannot reproduce that law in the written 
form of the English language (let alone the legalese of Indian 
lawyers). The tribal courts can find, announce, and apply 
customary common law in their opinions (although they rarely 
do), but they cannot restore customary law to its placc as the 
lifeway or law way of any tribal community. Tribal 
74 T .. 1· REUER, supra note , at 198. 
75 TREUER, supra note l, at 197. 
communities can attempt to circumvent the Anglo-American 
style of adversarial adjudication (an atrocity in small, insular 
communities76) through the devclopmcnt of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms, such as pan-Indian-style peacemaker 
courts.77 Like Treuer's novelists, the best that modcrn tribal 
governments can do is to make very good copies. Regardless 
of whether these legal stmctures are good copies of custom 
and tradition or whether they involve radical changes away 
from Indigenous paradigms, these legal stmctures stand on 
their own as necessities in modem tribal life. And, like Treuer 
in the context of literature would say, these developments are 
important, even welcome. 
But Professor Treuer goes further-argues· that these 
"very good copies" are not indian culture at alL While singing' 
the praises of the work of Erdrich, Welch, and others in the 
Indian literature canon, he also whispers fraud. 78 Would he 
also whisper fraud when confronted with modcrn tribal law? 
IV. Reconciliation ... and a Critique 
So far, we have accessed the law of American Indians and 
the novels of American Indians as two parallel tracks. In my 
description of tribal law and to Professor Treuer's description 
of Native American literature, there are numerous parallels. 
First and foremost, both can never be anything more than 
copies of the real thing. Modern tribal law for the large 
majority of Indian tribes consists of the borrowing of Anglo-
American legal constructs, language, and values by tribal 
16 See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 
24 N.M. L. REv. 225, 250 (1994). 
77 See Nancy A. Costello, Walking in a Good Way: Indian 
Peacemaker Courts in Michigan, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 875 (1999). 
78 To be clear, Professor Treuer mostly does not allege that the authors are 
committing fraud themselves, but that the literary critics that read and 
publicize these works through their scholarly pap<-'TS and book jacket bJurbs 
commit a kind of fraud when they make the representation that the work of 
Erdrich, Welch, et ai., is a genuine expression of Indian culture. See, e.g., 
TREUER, supra note 1, at 31 (IIclth D, Sweet Wong); id. at 32 (Allan 
Chavkin). However, with his exposition of Forrest Gerard's known fraud, 
The Education of Little Tree, to Shennan Alexie's Indian Killer, Treuer all 
but screeches fraud. See TREUER, supra note 1, at 159-89. 
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communities. And while tribal courts and legislatures may 
intend to recreate tribal customary law in the context of these 
borrowed laws and rules, that attempt can never be 
complete-and certainly not in the context of the English 
language. There is no realistic chance of the complete 
restoration of the customs and traditions as they existed prior 
to first contact. The link between American Indian culture and 
tribal law will have to be made in the context of Anglo-
American legal constructs and values. 
Professor Treuer's analysis of Native American literature 
reaches a similar conclusion. American lndian novelists 
writing in English, using Western literary techniques, cannot 
hope to be culture, they can only hope to become a compelling 
reproduction of culture through the intense longing and desire 
for culture. But Treuer's reading goes further into a nonnative 
judgment about the novels of American Indian writers. He 
argues that American Indian novelists are committing a form 
of literary fraud by writing "Native American literature" when 
in fact they do not live in the culture and do not speak the 
language. Treuer's "cultural patrimony" is represented by 
someone ]ike himself, who lives palt of the year in Indian 
Country and is fluent in the language of his community.79 
Professor Trcuer bridged the gap between his work on the 
literature of American Indians and the paradox of tribal law 
and governance by asserting that the flaw with the novels of 
American Indian writers who do not speak the language also 
infects tribal government. He has recently written that tribal 
sovereignty as understood by tribal governments that conduct 
their business in English is "peculiar."so It stands to reason, 
79 See, e.g., DAVID TREUER, THE TRANSLATION OF DR. ApPELLES: A LOVE 
STORY (2006); DAVID TRElIER, THE HJAWATHA (1999); DAVID TREUER, 
LnTLE (1995). 
KO David Trcuer, Jibwaa-ozhibii 'igewin, 30 AM. INDIAN Q. 3, 7 (2006). The 
entire statement reads, "With few exccptions--thc Southwest and some 
communities in Canada--OUf tribal communities arc governed in English. 
Our tribal councils conduct business in English, write their by-laws and 
constitutions in English, and debate issues in English. Clearly OUf tribal 
languages do not influence tribal governance as, such--cven though we 
might be sovereign-it is a peculiar kind of sovereignty." ld. Cf TREUER, 
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given Treuer's stance on novels written in English by 
American Indian writers, that he views tribal government as a 
mere "copy" of traditional (and therefore ideal) tribal 
govcmance. Or, in other words, to take his argument to its 
logical conclusion, as he did with Sherman Alexic,sl it is 
reasonable to assert that he views tribal government as a fraud 
as well. 
The argument that tribal govcmments are frauds has a 
great deal of logical and rhetorical weight. Tribal governments 
tend to govern by majority rule, under the tenns of governing 
documents (written in English) that tend to grant enormous 
political power in the hands of a few tribal members that have 
little or no inherent competence for the work they have been 
elected to do. Indian lawyers (some of them rn~mbers of the 
community) have incredible persuasive authority to order 
tribal leaders around and to write the laws (again, in English) 
that cabin whatever traditional governance values remain. It is 
likely that no reservation Indian or a close relative or friend 
has not been adversely impacted by a decision from one of 
these new-style tribal governments. Tribes are engaged in 
active disenrollment of tribal members based on strained 
readings of membership criteria (and some would say greed). 
Tribes fire qualified tribal members from tribal government 
jobs for arbitrary and capricious (read: political) reasons. 
Tribes engage in business development that will impact the 
environment. Tribes donate money to dirty state and federal 
politicians and lobbyists. David Treuer is not engaged in 
offering solutions to tribal governance problems, but his 
writings suggest that one solution would be a return to 
traditional governance, placing a premium on ~raditional tribal 
culture, where every word spoken is in the language and every 
action taken is consistent with tradition and custom. 
supra note 1, at 199 (referring to "the mistake of the common loon 
(incidentally the chieftain clan among the Ojibwe) who answers his own 
call echoed back from the next lake over, and, unaware of the mistake, is 
urged to call again, and again---only to remaincternally thwarted."). 
81 See TREUER, supra note 1, at 159-89. 
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But this vision of American Indian culture is not one I am 
willing to buy. And, frankly,. it would appear, neither would 
Professor Treuer. This "cultural patrimony" is not my own 
and, in fact, is not anyone's. In this world, American Indian 
culture is static and rigid, unwilling and unable to grow and to 
preserve itself. It is Professor Hart's ancient society governed 
by primary rules, with no means to change. It is the same 
understanding. of tribal culture that anti-Indian fishing and 
hunting opponents use when they assert that Indians should 
not be able to fish with modern boat and net technology or 
hunt with modem weapons.82 It is the same view of tribal 
culture that many non-Indians have'----or, as Treuer writes, 
"Somewhere along the way-in the eighteenth century 
perhaps-Indians bccame associated with a very specific set 
ofvirtues.,,83 Indian people took the goods thcy received from 
the French, English, and Americans in trade to make their own 
lives easier, leading anthropologists to argue that they were no 
longer Indians. 84 They made their own additions and 
subtractions from the culture.85 Much of the history of the 
survival of Indian people and communities in the face of 
genocidal and assimilative American Indian law and policy 
can bc framed this way: Sometimes Indian people traded away 
their traditional religion and language in order to remain in 
their homelands; sometimes Indian people traded their 
~2 See, e.g., State v. Gumoe, 192 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Wis. 1972) (holding 
that Indian treaty rigbts could only be exercised using the technology of 
Indian people at treaty times); cf United St<'ltes v. Washington, 384 f . 
. Supp. 312, 362,402 (W.D. Wash. 1974); Karen Ferguson, Indian Fishing 
Rights: The Aftermath of the Fox Decision and the Year 2000, 23 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 97, 145-46 (1998). 
83 TREUER, supra note 1, at 73. 
84 .See D'ARCY McNICKLE, NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM: INDIAN 
SURVIVALS AND RENEWALS 7-11 (rev. ed. 1973). 
&5 See generally D' ARCY McNICKLE, TREY CAME HERE FIRST 283 (rev. 
ed. 1975) ("indian societies did not disappear by assimilating to the 
dominant white culture, as predicted, but assimilated to themselves bits and 
pieces of the surrounding cultural environment. And they remained . 
indubitably Indian, whether their constituents lived in a tight Indian 
community or commuted betwecn the conmmnity and an urban job 
market."). 
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bomelands away in order to retain their religion and 
language.86 Flexible Indian communities with the intention of 
surviving by adapting had a better chance of avoiding 
extinction than those who did not adapt.1l7 Moreover, the 
religions and languages did not disappear altogether; they 
went underground and are being resurrected to the extent 
possible. And Indian tribes continue to take every measure 
possible to restore their traditional territories to tribal 
membership. As a means of survival, Indian people appear to 
occupy what Richard White called a "middle ground" within 
American culture.88 
Professor White's "middle ground" was both a territory 
and a cultural mixture that included much of the Great Lakes 
region during the 17th and 18th centuries during a time when 
traditional tribal communities and French fur traders interacted 
and overlapped.l!9 When the cultures first met, the "new people 
86 Compare, e.g., JAMES A. CUl'TON, THE POKAGONS, 1683-1983: 
CATHOLIC POTAWATOMI INDIANS OF THE ST. JOSEPH RIVER VALLEY 
(1984) (Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians) with, e.g., JAMES A. 
CUFTON, THE PRAiRIE PEOPLE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN 
POTAWATOMI INDIAN CULTURE (1977) (Citizen Potawatomi and Prairie 
Band Potawatomi Nation). 
87 See McNICKLE, NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM, supra note 85, at 4 
("Only the Indians seemed unwilling to accept oblivion as an appropriatc 
final act for their role in the New World drama. Caught up in succeeding 
waves of devastating epidemics and border wars as settlement moved 
westward, the Indians retreated, protecting what they could, and managing 
to be at hand to fight another day when necessity required it. They lost, but 
were never defeated."). 
88 RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND 
REpUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815, at ix-x (1991). 
Gerald Vizenor's theory of "survivance" is a tempting explanation as 
well, but not as satisfying because it does not account as well for the 
meaning created by the mixture of these Indian and Anglo-AmericaJ1 
cultures, nor docs it account for the endgame where Indian people returned 
to the status of the "exotic" or "other." See generally GERALD VIZENOR, 
MANIFEST MANNE}{s: NARRATIVES OF POSTINDIAN SURVIVANCE (1994); 
Gerald Vizenor, Native American Narratives: Resistance and Survivance, 
Address at North Dakota State University (April 22, 2005). CJ. Malea 
Powell, Rhetorics of Survivance: How American Indians Use Writing, 53 
COLLEGE COMPOSITION AND COMMUNICATION 396 (2002). 
89 See generally WHITE, supra note 88, at 50-93. 
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were crammed into existing categories in a mechanical way," 
with Indians classified as savages and the French classified as 
manitous.90 Because neither side could accomplish their goals 
by force, "[t]he middle ground grew according to the need of 
people to find a means, other than force, to gain the 
cooperation or consent of foreigners.,,91 According to White, 
"the central and defining aspect of the middle ground was the 
willingness of those who created it to justify their own actions 
in terms of what they perceived to be their partner's cultural 
premises:.92 The two sides sought out aspects of "congruence" 
in their respective cultures for this purpose, sometimes leading 
to what outsiders what consider "ludicrous" interpretations, 
but "[a Jny congruence, no matter how tenuous, can be put to 
work and take on a life of its own if it is accepted by both 
sides.,,93 White's conclusion has powerful import for 
analyzing Treuer's theory of "cultural patrimony": "Cultural 
conventions do not have to be true to be effective any more 
than legal precedents do, They only have to be accepted.,,94 
Treuer's view of his "cultural patrimony" compels him to 
question a tribal government conducting its official business 
using the language of the "conqueror,,95-English-but his 
view exemplifies a fundamental nai'vete about where tribal 
governments exist in the American political system.96 Indian 
tribes are efficient and effective implementing agents of 
federal law and policy as they administer, for example, large 
federal housing. health care, roads construction, law 
enforcement, education, and general administrative projects in 
accordance with complex federal spending regulations.97 
9() WHITE, supra note 88, at 5l. 
91 WHITE, supra note 88, at 52. 
92 WHITE, supra note 88, at 52. 
93 WHITE, supra note 88, at 52-53. 
94 WHITE, supra note 88, at 53. 
95 Cf Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823). 
96 See generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian 
Tribes within "Our Federalism H: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 
CONN. L. REv. 667 (2006). 
97 E.g., Native American Housing and Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 4101 et seq.; Indian Sclt:Determination and Educational Assistance 
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a et seq. See general~y COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF 
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Tribal governments must be able to listen and speak to federal 
e11lployces and officers and to the Congressional and 
Executive branch leadership. As explicated in Part II, tribal 
governments had little choice in the face of physically 
dominant -and oppressive American legal, political, and 
cultural attacks but to react to this process by adapting Anglo-
American legal constructs. Some tribes have performed this 
ongoing task better than others. Every day, tribal leaders and 
Indian lawyers face down the federal government, state 
governments, county commissioners, school boards, waste 
management districts, and so on. Tribal leaders make 
decisions and tribal judges make law in this context. Failure to 
govern in this context is political death. It would be easy in the 
abstract to value "authenticity" above adaptation and to reject 
or disparage anything claiming to be authentic that does not 
square with some traditional Indian's "cultural patiimony.,,98 
It would be easy but simply wrong. No community can 
survive by ignoring the outside world or through stubborn 
inflexibility. Of course, there are and will always be those in 
the federal government who will refuse to listen and speak to 
tribal governments. And there are and will always be Indian 
people who will refuse to listen and speak to the federal 
government. Both types of outsiders are tolerated by those in 
the middle ground, but they are utterly ineffective in the 
modern version of the "middle ground," where legitimate 
attempts at understanding and congruence " are the currency of 
survival. 
The "middle ground". also provides an analytical tool 
useful in responding to Treuer's critique of the literature 
written by American Indians. Treuer himself admits that he 
has never seen a novel written entirely in an American Indian 
language.99 Treuer focuses on how the work of Erdrich, et a1. 
is interpreted by non-Tndian literary critics, but he ignores how 
their work is interpreted (and enjoyed) by American Indians. 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ch, 22 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. cds. 2005) 
(describing federal government services for Indians). 
9R supra note 1, at 193, 198. 
99 See Treuer, Jibwaa-ozhibii 'igewin, supra note 80, at 7. 
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And therein rests the fatal flaw of Treuer's critique of 
American Indian novels as culture-Treuer forgets how these 
writers speak to Indians. For the vast majority of American 
Indians who arc members of Indian tribes and who live on or 
near Indian Country, the art of Erdrich, Alexie, .Welch, Silko, 
and Treuer is the part of their culture that links reservation 
Indian people to urban Indians to non~Indians-·-the cultural 
"middle ground.,,100 Indian people would not exist without this 
part, of their culture. It is to be valued, not attacked for being 
inauthentic. Professor Treuer denies that the work of 
American Indian writers in English is "culture," but what else 
could it be? Indians do not stop being Indians because they 
cannot speak their language or recite the stories of their 
ancestors. If this were tme, then genocide is all but complete. 
But writers like Louise Erdrich and Sherman Alexie and even 
David Treuer exemplify the viability, flexibility, and 
incredible staying power of American Indian people and 
culture. 
Conclusion 
There are many trickster tales told by the Anishinaabeg, 
most starring Wenebozho bin Treuer's preferred spelling) or 
Nanabozho. In one story, l 1 Nanabozho and his family are 
starving. I02 After a series of failures in convincing (tricking) 
the woodpecker and muskrat spirits into being meals, 
Nanabozho convinces (tricks) several birds and kills them. He 
eats his fin, saves the rest for later, and takes a nap. During the 
night, men approach. Nanabozho's buttocks warn him twice: 
too See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Looking to the East: The StOries of 
Modern Indian People and the Development o/Tribal Law, 5 SEATTLE J. 
SOC. JUST. 1, 18-19 (2006) (referencing the opening of Shennan Alexie's 
mm The Business of Fancy dancing at a small, independent movie theater 
on the Grand Traverse Band's reservation). 
lOJ This story is sometimes referred to as "The Duck Dinner." BORROWS, 
supra note 3, at 46-54 (citing RICHARD M. DORSON, BLO{)DSTOPPERS & 
BEARWALKERS 49-50 (1952». 
lO2 See Nanabozho in a Time 0/ Famine, in OJIBWA NARRATIVES, supra 
note 3, at 33,33-35. 
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ignores his buttocks and continues to sleep. When he awakens 
to find the remainder of his food stolen, he builds up his fire 
and bums his buttocks as punishment for their failure to warn 
him. 
In arguing that "Native American literature" does not 
exist, Professor Treuer burns his own buttocks. Whilc he 
claims to be making an attempt to avoid a claim that the work 
of Erdrich, Welch, Silko, Alexie, and so on are merely 
. 1 . 104 T < , k' l' 1 maut lentlc, < reuer s argument, ta en to It.;; oglca 
conclusion, denies the existence of any Indian culture. While 
perhaps Professor Treuer's literary critique is intended to 
create a nonnative distinction between the novels of writers 
like Erdrich and Alexie (best-sellers) and his own (not), he 
puts the culture and art of all American Indians·-and the law 
and politics of Indian tribes-in academic and intellectual 
jeopardy. Finally, very existence and viability ofn;lodem triba'l 
govermnents--despite all their flaws from all the borrowing 
and imposition of Anglo-American legal COllstructs--· 
disproves the normative truth of Professor Treuer's theory. 
Indian people and Indian culture lives on in new and changing 
<forms every minute. Such is survivaL 
Miigwetch. 
103 [d. at 35. 
104 See TREUER, supra note 1, at 193. 
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